Institution for Social and Policy Studies

Advancing Research • Shaping Policy • Developing Leaders

Envy, Altruism, and the International Distribution of Trade Protection

PI display: 
Xiaobo Lu, Ken Scheve, Matthew Slaughter
ISPS ID: 
P10-006
Date: 
June 1, 2009
Status: 
Under review
Location: 
Location details: 
China, United States
Context: 
International political economy
Planning document / hypotheses: 
We propose and model one possible explanation for why lower-earning and less-skilled intensive industries tend to receive relatively high levels of trade protection: that individual aversion to inequality—both envy and altruism—lead to systematic differences in support for trade protection across industries, with sectors employing lower-earning workers more intensively being relatively preferred recipients for trade protection.
Sample size: 
China: 2,456; USA: 2,265
Discipline: 
Area of study: 
Last updated: 
June 28, 2010