“When Clients Exit: Breaking the Clientelistic Feedback Loop,” Tesalia Rizzo, MIT

Event time: 
Friday, September 7, 2018 - 12:00pm through 1:15pm
Location: 
Institution for Social and Policy Studies (PROS77 ), A001
77 Prospect Street
New Haven, CT 06511
Speaker: 
Tesalia Rizzo, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Event description: 

ISPS EXPERIMENTS WORKSHOP

Abstract: Why do individuals in the developing world turn to clientelist intermediaries to gain access to welfare benefits? How do these interactions impact political behavior? Existing theories view clientelistic intermediaries – brokers who provide services in exchange for political support – as agents of politicians and political parties. In this paper, I argue that individuals rely on intermediaries because they face high bureaucratic transaction cost when directly making claims on the state; however, relying on intermediaries inhibits individuals from gaining useful bureaucratic know-how, further entrenching their dependency on clientelism in a clientelist feedback loop. A large-scale field experiment in rural Mexico that reduces the costliness of claim-making by providing a facilitator trained to assist citizens in applying for welfare programs tests this argument. I find that reducing the costs of direct claim-making nearly doubled the number of claims made through non-clientelist avenues. In addition, the intervention both weakened the belief that entitlements must be reciprocated with political support and diminished general approval of quid-pro-quo exchanges, two key norms that sustain clientelism. Reducing the costs that citizens face in making claims directly can weaken clientelism and bolster individuals’ political autonomy, strengthening citizenship.

Tesalia Rizzo is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, studying comparative political behavior using a variety of techniques such as field experiments, surveys, interviews and observational data. Her dissertation explores how bureaucratic transaction costs prevent individuals from directly claiming welfare benefits. Instead, these costs make citizens dependent on clientelist brokers and intermediaries who demand political favors in return for access.

Open to: 
Yale Faculty, Yale Postdoctoral Trainees, Yale Graduate and Professional Students