Peer Reviewed Article

Widespread Partisan Gerrymandering Mostly Cancels Nationally, But Reduces Electoral Competition

Authors
  • Kosuke Imai
  • Christopher T. Kennya
  • Shiro Kuriwaki
  • Cory McCartan
  • Tyler Simkoa
Published
June 23, 2023
Publication
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Discipline
Areas of Study
Geographic Areas
Document Control Number(s)
  • ISPS 23-23
Citation

Kennya, C.T., McCartan, C., Simkoa, T., Kuriwaki, S. and Imai, K. (2023). Widespread Partisan Gerrymandering Mostly Cancels Nationally, But Reduces Electoral Competition. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS), 120 (25) e2217322120.DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2217322120

Abstract

Congressional district lines in many US states are drawn by partisan actors, raising concerns about gerrymandering. To separate the partisan effects of redistricting from the effects of other factors including geography and redistricting rules, we compare possible party compositions of the US House under the enacted plan to those under a set of alternative simulated plans that serve as a nonpartisan baseline. We find that partisan gerrymandering is widespread in the 2020 redistricting cycle, but most of the electoral bias it creates cancels at the national level, giving Republicans two additional seats on average. Geography and redistricting rules separately contribute a moderate pro-Republican bias. Finally, we find that partisan gerrymandering reduces electoral competition and makes the partisan composition of the US House less responsive to shifts in the national vote.

Description

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Related Data:

All data and code necessary to replicate the analyses are available on the Harvard Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JI1U8X.